There is large consensus about the proposition that social capital makes good governments. However, despite a large literature on this topic the mechanisms trough which social capital affects the functioning of institutions is not well understood. In this paper we look at the selection of politicians as a means trough which social capital can foster the quality of local governments, proposing a relationship between social capital and the efficiency of the electoral mechanism at the local level. Our question is: does social capital encourage the re-election of good politicians? Based on data for about 8,000 Italian municipalities over the period 2003-2012 we find that, after controlling for individual characteristics of the majors, local characteristics, and financial transfer from the central government, social capital significantly improves the re-election of good politicians. The higher the level of social capital in the municipality, the higher the probability of being re-elected for majors whose policy is characterized by: i. higher level of capital expenditure; ii. higher level of property tax. Our results suggest that introducing a strong decentralization reform in a country like Italy, historically plagued by considerable differences on these aspects, might constitute a source of further regional divergence.
Introduction
There is large consensus about the proposition that social capital makes good governments. However, despite a large literature on this topic the mechanisms trough which social capital affects the functioning of institutions is not well understood (Boix and Posner, 1998; Tavits, 2006) ; evidence showing that social capital brings about better government performance does not say much about why this happens (Nannicini et al., 2013) . In this paper we look at the selection of politicians as a means trough which social capital can foster the quality of local governments, proposing a relationship between social capital and the efficiency of the electoral mechanism at the local level. We would argue that social capital makes good governments because it improves the effectiveness of the selection of politicians; in brief, social capital makes good governments because it makes good politicians. We measure the performance of politicians by taking their fiscal policy during their first term of office, namely the types of local expenditure and the types of local taxation, and then we study their re-election conditioned to their fiscal performance and the level of local social capital. Our central question therefore is: does social capital encourage the re-election of good politicians?
The role of elections has received scant attention in studies looking at the relationship between social capital and the performance of governments, particularly at the local level (for a recent work on national election this, see Nannicini et al., 2013) . However, this has become more and more relevant as the number of countries which has undertaken decentralization reforms have remarkably increased over the past years (Burgess, 2012) . The capacity of local elections to deliver good local politicians is of twofold importance. Firstly, because as a result of these reforms a larger fraction of public goods and services are provided at the local level. For instance, fixed-capital investment (e.g. local transportation) in decentralized countries is a primary responsibility of local governments. This is precisely the case of Italy, in which a reform has been introduced in 2001 which has resulted in greater fiscal power of local governments. The municipalities are responsible for some fifty per cent of total fixed capital investment in the country. The second reason is that local politics is a key way to access to central government politics (Besley, 2005) . To the extent to which local elections are effective in selecting good politicians, this will also affect the quality of the central governments.
With this regard, Italy represents an appropriate context of analysis for several important reasons (Ichino and Maggi, 1999; Nannicini et al., 2013) . Firstly, Italy is marked by profound local and regional differentials in terms of social environment. As a matter of fact, it has often served as a quasi-experiment country to explore the role of social characteristics, such as culture, social capital and trust, since the seminal works of Banfield (1967) and Putnam (1993) . Secondly, Italy reports an inter-regional economic gap that goes beyond the classical NorthSouth dualism (De Sanio et al. 2009 ) and that has been often attributed to differences in the quality of the local policy as well as in social norms and civic spirit (Guiso et al. 2004) . Thirdly, as a result of recent reforms, particularly the introduction of their direct election with a majoritarian system and fiscal federalism, local majors have a significant power and autonomy over the delivering of several relevant public policies. Finally, focusing on one single country allows us to explore the importance of social factors and informal institutions within the same formal institutional setting.
We have collected data for about 8,000 Italian municipalities over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . We collect data on their budget, including expenditures, revenues and transfers form the central State. Budget data are merged with data on local elections, in particular about the majors of the municipalities. We also collect data on social capita. Our analysis is based on # local elections in which we focus on re-election of the majors already in office. This allows us to study the determinants of re-election conditioned on the past observed performance of the officer during their first mandate and the level of social capital. The results confirm a relationship between the level of social capital and the quality of the local electoral mechanism. After controlling for individual characteristics of the majors, local characteristics, and financial transfer from the central government, our results show that social capital significantly improves the re-election of good politicians. The higher the level of social capital in the municipality, the higher the probability of being re-elected for majors whose policy is characterized by: i. higher level of capital expenditure; ii. higher level of property tax. The focus on capital expenditure, contrasted to current expenditure, suggests a greater attention to long-term development and a greater capacity of programming and managing complex projects. The predominance of property tax as a source of revenue, compared to income surcharge tax, suggests a greater efficiency and transparency in the management of the local revenues.
Our paper establishes a bridge between the research on the relationship between social capital and institutions, and research on the role of the role of the electoral mechanism for delivering good politicians and good politics. As for the former, since the seminal work by Putnam (1993) , one of the major social factors that affect the working of a democracy and the correct functioning of its institutions is social capital. Concerning the latter, a growing literature in the political economy field has increasingly focused on the factors which make elections effective, starting from the assumption that there are several asymmetric information and misalignments in the incentives between citizens and politicians which can make the electoral system working in a non-satisfactorily way (Besley, 2007) . According to this research, bad public policy is the result of bad selection of politicians in the first place (Besley, 2005; Braendle, 2014) . The closes paper to our analytical framework is that by Nannicini et al. (2014) who look at political accountability and social capital on the Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period. They find that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in electoral districts with high social capital. There are two major differences with our paper. Firstly, they look at individual behaviors of politicians in terms of corruption and crime prosecution, while we focus on public policy performance. Secondly, they focus on the members of the central government while our concern is on local officers. This second aspect related our work with studies on the efficiency of decentralization, particularly on the relationship between social capital and decentralization reforms. The main issue here is that the several advantages which decentralization can bring about in terms of improving public policy and politicians behaviors depend on several circumstances. Bad institutions, corruption, scarce attention of citizens to politics, low transparency in the media, are just some factors which can undermine and make things far worst compared to what envisaged by fiscal federalism theories (Bardhan, 1997; Faguet, 2014; Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016; Kwon, 2013; Lowndes et al., 2006; Tanzi, 2001) . Our results suggest that the presence of social capital is also an important precondition which makes fiscal federalism work better, especially in countries characterized by profound regional differences in terms of institutional capacity. Our results suggest that introducing a strong decentralization reform in a country like Italy, historically plagued by considerable differences on these aspects, might constitute a source of further regional divergence.
Social Capital between Sanction and Cooperation
Within a social dilemma framework, altruistic co-operators are individuals seeking to maximise joint outcomes and to choose a win-win solution to disagreement (Bogaert et al. 2008) . Individuals adopting this behaviour are defined prosocially oriented with a natural inclination to cooperate for the benefit of the community due to a stronger sense of social responsibility (De Cremer et al. 2001) . Alternatively, proselfs are individuals trying to maximise their own outcome even at the costs of others' conditions.
Drawing from the various definitions of social capital, one of its main ingredients is the presence of a system of norms of civic cooperation internalised by the community and governing its members' behaviours. In other words, a community rich in social capital can count on more prosocial individuals and, hence, more likely overcome to problems of rent-seeking behaviour (Alm and Gomez 2008 and of credible commitments (Knack and Keefer 2003) . This occurs because the social norms "in force" within a community distinguish between proper or correct from improper and incorrect behaviours assumed by its members (Coleman 1990) . Regarding to problems of credible commitments, these can be manifested in different types of social exchange: from a financial contract when one party breaks the promise of future repayment (Guiso et al. 2004 ) to an employment contract where one if not both parties break a promise of accomplishing particular tasks (Knack and Keefer 2003) . When this violation occurs, even altruistic co-operators will be willing to adopt some sort of social sanctions.
The application of social sanctions seems to be more straightforward among peers than when the individuals involved are related one to another by some sort of vertical and hierarchic linkage. In fact, multi-rounds laboratory experiments show that within a group of peers prosociality is more effective under punishment condition. This is when a member of the group can punish another member for his anti-social behaviour adopted by reducing his endowment in the following round (Fehr and Gachter 2000) .
When the socio-economic exchange lies on a vertical linkage, the mechanism of the sanctions might assume a different perspective. Recently there is an emerging literature highlighting the existence of a psychological contract between the state and its citizens based on informal mutual obligations. According to this perspective, citizens' willingness to fulfil the terms of this implicit agreement tend to increase when they perceive that the institutions are acting efficiently and fairly (Andriani and Sabatini 2014; Feld and Frey 2002) . Alternatively, the citizens' perception of contract breaches might undermine their trust towards institutions and, hence, citizens' sanctions might take place, for example in the form of lower attitude towards tax compliance (Andriani 2015, Feld and Frey 2002; 2007) . On a similar line, for instance, in the case of the Italian municipalities, Barone and Mocetti (2009) find that citizens' attitude towards tax compliance decreases with public spending inefficiencies. This attitude can be interpreted as a citizens' sanction towards lack of a credible commitment of an institution that fails in taking good care of the public resources.
Another occasion for the citizens to sanction what they might consider bad institutional governance is during the voting time. The re-election of the same political leaders might represent a reward of their ability to fulfil the terms of the previous implicit agreement as well as a sanction otherwise. Among several other factors, the decision of re-electing or not the same leader might also depend on the social values influencing the behaviour of the voters and their judgment about previous others' behaviour. In fact, prosocials tend to evaluate others' behaviour more on the basis of morality dimensions considering values of fairness, honesty and social responsibility (Joireman et al 2003) . Alternatively proself individuals are more concerned to dominate the others, accomplish personal goal and, hence evaluate others' behaviours along the potency dimension (Bogaert et al. 2008 ). According to this perspective, it is likely that in context with higher social capital endowment the re-election of the same political leader might be conditional to a more efficient and forward-looking public spending management. This might be the case of a public spending agenda based on a more medium-long run rather than on a short-run strategy that risks of leading to a public deficit. In context rich of social capital, a public spending ended into a deficit might be interpreted as failure in the management of the public resources and, hence, a violation of a credible commitment of the institution towards its citizens. The reaction could be the citizens' sanction of no re-electing the same political leader.
Data and Methods

Data Sources
Data for this project were collected and combined by using several data sources. Data on demographics of candidates and elections where both provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministero dell'Interno). There data provide information, among others, on municipal electoral results on electoral dates, votes, ballots, turnouts, and number of candidates. These data are available together with information on demographic and personal characteristics of candidates like education, profession date of birth. Using these data we were able to create the two dummies used throughout the paper. The first indicates if the candidate is running for a re-election to be mayor, the second indicates if the candidate won the election.
Our main indicator of social capital is the "voice" component of the indicator of institutional quality index available at this website (https://sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/home) 1 . Data for this variable are, however, available from 2004 to 2012 and are synthetic measures of the social capital at the provincial level. Data on municipal public finance and indicators of fiscal performance span from the fiscal year 2003 to 2012, and have been kindly provided by OPEN POLIS (English version of the site: http://www.openpolis.it/eng/), an Italian independent association providing data on politicians and politicians' activity. Additional data at the municipal level are from the Italian Institute of Statistics (www.istat.it). These contain information on population and demographic structure of the population at the municipal level. The resulting dataset contains candidate level information grouped within municipalities for each electoral date. Fiscal data are logarithmic transformations of per capita values averaged for the time span starting the year after the previous election to the year of the current election.
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Empirical Strategy
Our baseline model is the linear specification in equation 1: is a dummy variable measuring if candidate i in municipality j during the elections in year t has been elected (1) or not (0). is another dummy variable equal to one if the candidate is running for the second time for office after being elected in her first one. We built this variable in two different ways. If the candidate is running right after the accomplishment of her first term as mayor, or looking at the history and attributing the value one to this dummy also if the candidate is re-running after skipping the elections. Estimates do not change relevantly in this second case. The reason is that the vast majority of re-runners in the sample decided to re-run in the electoral race right after the ending of the first mandate.
is the average value of the social capital indicator measured for the time span covering from the year after the previous election in the municipality, , to the present electoral year . Note that the value has to be indexed with the previous election because, while the usual time span is 5 years according to the Italian Electoral Law, we observe that in several cases elections have been anticipated. A similar strategy has been adopted for the per capita fiscal variables ( , ( : − ) ), which are observed on a yearly basis. Moreover, in both cases we log transformed the variables. Before explaining the intuition behind the extensive use of the interactions identified by the parameters 4 − 7 , we finally include (i) a set of control variables measured at the candidate and municipal level, summarized by the vector ′ , and (ii) both elections ( ) and municipal ( ) fixed effects, in this second case only in some specifications. 2 The intuition behind the interaction terms is that we want to measure the association between social capital and re-election conditional both on the between-elections fiscal history in the municipality and on the candidate being a re-running mayor in office. Let us omit the other control variables, simplify a bit the notation, and focus only on the parameters 1 − 7 . Note that the marginal impact of a change of on is:
In particular:
From which we can derive:
Equation 1d shows that the difference in the effect of fiscal policy on the probability of electoral success between a re-runner and a first-runner is driven by 5 , which is the parameter estimating the interaction between fiscal measures and being a re-runner, and 7 , which is the direct effect of social capital on the wedge. In other terms:
In other terms, one way to interpret 7 is as the driver of the difference in the effect of fiscal policy on electoral success between a re-runner and a first-runner.
Let us assume that is a measure positively associated with re-election. This would be the case in a municipality where voters are particular sensitive to fiscal rigor and is an inverse measure of the municipal public debt. Assume also, for simplicity, that =0 = 0. 3 Because voters know that past fiscal performance is an outcome that affects only re-runners.
In this case ( =1 ) = 7 and an estimated positive value of 7 would indicate the presence of a positive association between re-electoral opportunities upon a rigorous management of public finances, and the level of social capital in the Province where the municipality is located. First-mandate mayors in those municipalities located in Provinces with higher social capital have more incentives, in terms of re-electoral perspectives and competitive edge of first-runners, at pursuing rigorous public spending in line with voters' preferences.
Using the Conditional Logit Model (CLM)
Equation (1) is estimated by using OLS. This is known to be the Linear Probability Model (LPM). While there is no unanimous consensus on nonlinear models being preferred, given the nature of the dependent variable, we test also a logit. In particular, the conditional logistic regression allows controlling for common municipal characteristics by avoiding at the same time the incidental parameter problem one would encounter were fixed effects explicitly estimated as in a linear model.
Most of all, similar results in comparable models would validate the robustness of the type of conditional association between social capital and probability of re-election that we are exploring.
Results
The baseline model: fiscal performance and re-election
This section reports the results of the estimations and comments them. Table 2 reports the baseline model which does not consider the effect of the social capital. We report here only the fixed effects model of logit estimates (see the Appendix for robustness checks using pooled estimations and linear probability models). Our explanatory variables, expenditures and revenues, are here interacted only with the variable re-election. Therefore it accounts for the impact of fiscal performance on the likelihood of being re-elected, after having controlled for several other variables. The six models in the table report the interaction of each of the fiscal performance measures. By looking at the joint effect of the majors' fiscal performance and the re-election dummy, it arises that among the types of expenditure, capital expenditure increases the probability of re-election; among the type of revenues, the total amount of revenues per capita increases the probability of re-election, but with a stronger effect of income revenues compared to a weaker effect of property tax.
[ Table 2 about here]
As for the control variables, both the presence of a ballot at the previous election and a close win positively affect the probability of re-election. Concerning the individual characteristics of the majors, as expected and consistently with several other studies higher levels of education help re-election. Among the professions only workers in the army signal a positive effect on reelection. This is consistent with studies which find that there are some occupation's characteristics that can positively influence election, such as occupations that are known within their communities, occupation whose competences are considered related to issues relevant for local politics (Mechtel, 2014) . Finally, the amount of transfer from the central government and the size of the municipality do not play any significant role on the probability of being re-elected.
Summing up, the baseline model signals a positive role of the expenditure of capital investment on the probability of being re-elected. This is an interesting result if we assume that expenditure on capital investment have three desirable features when compared to current expenditures: i. they provide the basis for further economic development, i.e. they are productive; ii. they signal a long-run view of the officers in charge; iii. they suggest a capability of majors to carry out longterm planning and good administrative capacity. Further, this result has to be contextualized in the Italian period under analysis here. Chiades and Mengotto (2013) show a generalized reduction of capital expenditure in the Italian municipalities, and a subsequent re-composition of the expenditure from capital to current expenditure. Among the reasons the authors enumerate two factors. Firstly, a lack of capacity in planning as well as managing complex activities; secondly, a phenomenon of 'overshooting' in which the majors, in order to comply to the Local Stability Pact rule, 4 tend to be over cautious in planning less flexible types of expenditure. For all these reasons, it is very sensible that citizens have rewarded those majors which have invested during a period in which investment have drop while current expenditure grew between 9.5% and 15.1% in large and small municipalities respectively.
The results about the local revenues are symmetric to those about investment. Citizens do not punish majors who raise revenues, possibly to the extent that they are employed for investment. Income tax is leading this result comparing to property tax. It should be noted that in this period income tax has grown considerable, becoming an important source of local revenue. However, property tax and income tax are different forms of taxation. The virtues of the local property tax, ascribed to its relatively low efficiency costs and benign impact on growth, have been already discussed (Norregaard, 2013; see OECD, 2010 see OECD, , 2012a Presbitero et al., 2014) . Accordingly, taxes on property are less likely to affect people's behavior than income (or wage) taxes making the former the most growth-friendly of all major taxes. According to the tax assignment problem (McLure, 1998; Musgrave, 1983) in a multi-layered government structure, taxation executed by local governments should mostly focus on property taxes and user fees. 5 While income taxes are decentralized on a tax sharing method, property taxes are mostly based on a tax separation scheme: only by the latter local governments make exclusive use of a given tax base. This implies more autonomy, improve accountability, and help distinguish between local and central responsibilities (Liberati, 2011) .
Another major difference between property tax and income tax is the possibility to use them strategically by the politicians in charge. For the reasons said above, in fact property tax is more transparent or more salient, compared to income tax. This is particularly the case for Italy. While the decisions concerning the property tax could clearly and unambiguously be attributed to the municipal government, this is not the case for the income tax surcharge. Central government maintained its full powers on the latter, including the definition of tax rates, tax base and tax brackets, while municipal governments could only raise a at surcharge on their tax income base. Several empirical studies in Italy have found that the tax burden has been shifted from property tax to income tax to hide the tax burden to citizens (Bordignon and Piazza, 2010) or when competition is high (Bracco et al., 2013) . As a result of these strategic behaviours, the revenue system becomes less transparent, less efficient and makes local politicians less accountable.
The interaction model: fiscal performance, social capital and re-election
In this section we test the central hypotheses of the paper. Table 3 reports the results of the interaction model presented above in which fiscal performance is jointly considered with our measure of social capital, conditioned on re-election (control variables are not reported in the table). The interaction coefficients are statistically significant only in two models. The coefficient about capital expenditure confirms not only that investment drives re-election, but also that its positive impact increases for higher levels of social capital. In order to better qualify this result we have calculated the average marginal effect (dydx) of capital expenditure on the linear prediction of re-election, along different percentiles of social capital (Figure 1 ). This chart suggests that passing from the 10 th percentile of social capital to the 90 th percentile increase the change in the probability of being re-elected passes from 5% to 12.5%. In other words, while on average capital expenditure increases the probability of re-election, the presence of a strong social capital remarkably affects this effect. Majors that make larger investment get a higher reward in municipalities with strong social capital.
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[ Figure 1 and 2 about here] Among local revenues, the first thing to notice is that when social capital is included neither total revenues or income tax affect re-election, contrary to the baseline model (cf. Table 2 ). By contrast, property tax is here the stronger predictor of re-election when it is jointly considered with social capital. This suggests that in municipalities with higher levels of social capital, majors who rely on property tax are more likely to be re-elected. By looking at Figure 2 what emerges is that when social capital is low, relying on property tax reduces the chances of being re-elected, while its effect is less statistically significant for higher levels of social capital. When the level of social capital is equal to the 30 th , 20 th , and 10 th percentile, the probability of being reelected reduces by 6.6%, 9.2%, and 16.9% respectively. This result also helps to understand the results in baseline model about income tax. If majors are less encourages relying on property tax when social capital is low, this encourages the shift from property tax to other less salient forms of taxes, such as income tax. This is precisely what is found by Bordignon et al. (Bordignon and Piazza, 2010) showing that lower quality politicians use the less transparent income tax instead of property tax in municipalities with lower levels of social capital and less information.
Summing up, our results seem to corroborate our hypotheses about a positive impact of social capital on fiscal performance by means of a more effective reward-punishment mechanism into the electoral process. Investing in long-term capital investment is rewarding for majors, but there are remarkable differences across levels of social capital: in municipalities with higher level of social capital, majors that invest in fixed capital obtain a more than twofold reward in terms of probability of being re-elected. Interesting results also arise on the local revenue side. Majors are on average encouraged to rely on the most efficient form of taxation, that is property tax, but in the case of low level of social capital they are instead discouraged to do so. This would instead encourage a shift from more salience taxation towards less salience taxation in low-social capital municipalities.
The fact that social capital encourages more virtuous behaviors of local policy makers, both on the expenditure side and on the revenue side, is an important finding with several key implications. Firstly, as said before, local capital investment represents, particularly in decentralized countries, a substantial share of total overall investment expenditure, as it is in the case of Italy whereas the municipalities account on average to 50 per cent of the total amount of investment, with the remaining 50 per cent divided among other local governments (30 per cent) and the central government (20 per cent). Secondly, by encouraging a more transparent revenue system social capital reinforces accountability of local politicians to the local constituencies. This has important implications on the provision of public services. In fact, decentralization with low transparency might lead to leniency also in the provision of public services (Tanzi, 2001) . Finally, rewarding virtuous behavior, the presence of social capital in the territory positively affects the selection of good politicians both at the local level and at the national level, to the extent that in decentralized systems local government is often the first step towards the central government.
This paper investigates a central issue in political economy, that is the relationship between social capital and good governance. We argue that a possible channel is the functioning of the electoral mechanism. That is, social capital increases good governance because it makes election working better. We find that, after controlling for individual characteristics of the majors, local characteristics, and financial transfer from the central government, social capital significantly improves the re-election of good politicians. This can have relevant implications for policy makers.
Firstly, our results suggest that introducing a strong decentralization reform in a country like Italy, historically plagued by considerable differences on these aspects, might constitute a source of further regional divergence.
Secondly, our analysis does address long-term issues. However, we might speculate that a source of long-term disparities in the quality of local governance between the North and South of Italy lies in an inefficient mechanism of the selection of policy makers, in turn depending on the well-documented disparities in the level of social capital. To this regard, we are elucidating one possible mechanism of the social capital-institutions nexus pioneered by Putnam by proposing a social capital-selection of politicians-institutions nexus. If the mechanism we suggest has a long-term validity, then the decentralization reform in Italy might exacerbate the institutional disparities which have long characterized Italy with possible detrimental effects on inter-regional economic gap. 
